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Abstract – The inequity of benefits among actors in the Indonesian patchouli value chain has been taking place for decades. 
This phenomenon has made distillers unable to guarantee the patchouli oil quality, one of the essential things in the global 
market. The objective of this study was to evaluate effects of modernization of distillation units and applications of a 
nonlinear return on investment (ROI) equity model to the financial performance of actors in the value chain to help the 
government together with the actors making the correct decisions and policies in the development of patchouli oil business. 
The study was done in the Gayo Lues District, Aceh, Indonesia. The findings indicate that the distillers get the least benefits 
(the lowest ROI) among actors in the Gayo Lues value chain. Moreover, modernization of the distillation units can increase 
the ROIs of the actors in the value chain. But, to observe how to establish equity among the actors, a nonlinear ROI equity 
model was developed. To make ROIs of the actors equal, outputs of the model recommend that the ideal patchouli oil 
share ratio between farmers and distillers is around 3.3 – 3.4: 1. Outputs of the model also suggest that both net gross and 
profits per kg of medium middlemen should be increased, while both net and gross profits per kg of large middlemen 
should be decreased. 
 
Keywords: distillation units, Gayo Lues, nonlinear ROI equity model, patchouli oil, value chain 
 
Introduction 
Indonesia is well-known as a significant contributor to the world’s patchouli oil requirement, exporting 
more than 2,000 tons per year (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2017). The global patchouli oil market, like 
most of the global essential oils market, demands many things, and one of the most important things is quality 
assurance (Alighiri et al., 2016; Sanganeria, 2015). However, several studies reported that many Indonesian 
patchouli oil producers, most of whom are small “poor” farmers and distillers, cannot meet the demands (Alighiri 
et al.,    2016; Rahmayanti et al., 2018).  
Besides, although the producers are key players to ensure the oil quality, they have the lowest control over 
the oil prices. Those who have the dominant control over the oil prices, especially at the local level, are 
middlemen (Suyono and Purwastuti, 2011), even though they have almost no contribution to the added value of 
the oil (Rahmayanti et al., 2018). Therefore, the producers get the least benefits (inequity) from patchouli business 
or among actors in patchouli value chains (Hendrastuti et al., 2012; Rahmayanti et al., 2018). The unfairness makes 
production activities (patchouli cultivation and distillation) less attractive than marketing activities for investors. 
As a result, the “rich” investors are only interested in marketing sectors, as middlemen or buyers. The inequity 
also limits the ability of the producers to improve the qualities of their productions to meet the global market 
demands. Many producers have not yet been able to apply Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) in cultivation and 
Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) in the distillation process (Hogervorst & Kerver, 2019; Rusli 2012). 
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The inequity has continued for decades in the patchouli value chain. Therefore, the government, together 
with the value chain actors, must pay more attention to this phenomenon in the development of the patchouli 
oil business. This study aims to evaluate the effects of the modernization of distillation units and applications of 
the ROI equity model to the financial performance of the actors in the value chain, especially to the distillers. 
We hope that this study can help the government together with the actors making the right policies and decisions 
in the development of the patchouli oil business. The nonlinear ROI equity model was developed using nonlinear 
programming with the leading indicator is that the ROIs of the actors are optimal (maximum and equal) in a 
stable price system. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Study location and data collections 
The study was carried out in Gayo Lues District, Aceh Province, Indonesia, in early 2018. Like coffee, 
Gayo Lues has a long historical tie with patchouli production. Gayo Lues is known as one of the primary 
producers of patchouli oil with excellent quality in terms of aroma and levels of patchouli alcohol (PA). However, 
they are not the only parameters that define the quality of the oil. Another critical parameter is the color variant 
of the oil. For numerous reasons, most distillers in Gayo Lues still operate traditional “asphalt drums” distillation 
units (non-GMP), producing a low yield and dark variant oil. The dark variant oil indicates that the oil is 
contaminated with iron from the drums. 
The data collected includes the marketing direction of patchouli oil, financial data of each actor, and 
monthly quantities supplied and local prices of patchouli oil. The data collections were carried out using about 
ten focus group discussions (FGDs) with 2 – 8 participants of farmers and distillers and in-depth interviews with 
2 (two) medium-scale local middlemen and 3 (three) large-scale local middlemen.  
 
Optimization of Gayo Lues patchouli value chain 
Pre-optimized conditions of the actors in the value chain 
 This section will focus on collecting data on the standard (initial) conditions of the actors in the value chain, 
including a conventional (primary) marketing channel, actors involved, and their financial/ performance data, 
followed by calculation and tabulation of the data.  
Technology optimization 
 The technology or physical optimization means the modernization of distillation units. So, here we discuss 
the replacement of traditional distillers with modern distillers into the value chains, their differences, and their 
effects on all actors in the value chain. 
Mathematical model optimization 
 The mathematical model optimization is done by using a nonlinear ROI equity model. The model 
optimization is aimed to simulate how to make the actors in the value chains can financially obtain the equity, 
where the primary indicator is ROIs of the actors are equal and maximum in a stable price system. The brief 
steps to develop the nonlinear ROI equity model and optimization in the Gayo Lues patchouli value chain are 
as follows: 
a. Determine the decision variables 
b. Determine the objective function 
c. Determine the constraints 
d. Model execution, validation, and analysis 
 The model optimization is implemented to marketing channel I, where traditional distillers exist in the value 
chain; and to marketing channel II, where modern distillers replace the traditional distillers’ position. 
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Results 
Pre-optimized conditions of Gayo Lues patchouli value chain 
The common (primary) marketing channel involving farmers, distillers, medium middlemen, and large 
middlemen in the Gayo Lues patchouli value chain is as presented in Figure 1, where Q is the quantity supplied 
(sales volume); C is the production/ marketing cost; P is the sales price of each actor.  The majority of the 
distillers are still operating traditional distillers 35 kg “asphalt drum” distillation units. Small middlemen were not 
found operating in the Gayo Lues District - Aceh Province, although they were reported to operate in other 
districts in the province (Caritas Czech Republic, 2010). While patchouli farmers in many areas of Indonesia 
usually sell leaves to distillers (Directorate General of National Export Development, 2015; Nugraha et al., 2019), 
patchouli farmers and distillers in Gayo Lues prefer to share the oil after distillation process based on agreed oil 
share ratio, usually at “farmer: distiller = 8.5%: 1.5%” share ratio, then sell the oil autonomously to middlemen. 
Farmers (0,1)
Traditional Distillers (2)
Medium Middlemen (3)Q0
P1; Q1
P2; Q2
P3; Q3
Big Middlemen (4) Exporter/ Supplier
P4; Q4
Q1
C2; Q1 + Q2
C3; Q3 C4; Q4
C1; Q1 + Q2
 
Note: P1 < P2 = P3 < P4; Q1 = Q3; Q2 + Q3 = Q4. 
Figure. 1. Marketing channel I, the typical (initial) marketing channel of Gayo Lues patchouli oil 
 
Table 1. The production/ sales frequencies, business capacities, annual incomes, and investment costs of the 
patchouli value chain actors participating in the initial marketing channel 
Actors Farmers Traditional Distillers Medium Middlemen Large Middlemen 
Productions/ sales 
frequencies 
semiannually, 2 
cropping seasons/ 
year 
daily, 2 batches/ day, 
24 working days/ 
month 
weekly, 52 transaction 
frequencies/ year 
monthly, 12 
transaction 
frequencies/ year 
Business capacities 0.7 ha/ farmer1), 
each farmer 
produces about 162 
kg oil/ ha/ year2) 
35 kg dried leaves/ 
batch, each distiller 
produces about 1.4 kg 
oil/ day = 403.2 kg 
oil/ year 
each middleman 
manages about 100 kg 
oil/ month = 1200 kg 
oil/ year 
each middleman 
manages about 
578.75 kg oil/ 
month = 6,945.00 
kg oil/ year 
Annual incomes (IDR) 76,572,171/ ha 34,841,299/ distiller 24,000,000/ 
middleman 
555,600,000/ 
middleman 
Total annual costs (IDR) 34,595,000/ ha 27,220,000/ distiller 18,204,854/ 
middleman 
109,148,111/ 
middleman 
Annual fixed costs (IDR) 3,520,000/ ha 700,000/ distiller 1,340,000/ 
middleman 
16,590,000/ 
middleman 
Annual variable costs (IDR) 31,075,000/ ha 26,520,000/ distiller 16,864,854/ 
middleman3) 
92,558,111/ 
middleman4) 
1) The average plantation area of patchouli per farmer in Gayo Lues is about 0.7 ha (Ernawati et al., 2018).  
2)farmers hold about 137.70 kg oil/ ha at existing “8.5: 1.5” of share ratio between farmers and distillers  
3)including IDR 1,283,261 total annual loan interest of the capital invested to purchase 100 kg oil/ month or 1,200 kg oil/ year 
( IDR 1,069/ kg) and IDR 11,121,593 total annual loan interest of the capital invested to deliver credit to the farmers ( IDR 
9,268/ kg) at 10% of discount factor  
4)including IDR 33,340,611 total annual loan interest of the capital invested to purchase 578.75 kg oil/ month or 6,945 kg oil/ 
year ( IDR 4,801/ kg) at 10% of discount factor  
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Table 1 shows the production/ sales frequencies, business capacities, annual incomes, and investment costs of 
the value chain actors in the current marketing channel of Gayo Lues patchouli oil. Additionally, Table 2 
presents pre-optimized financial data summary of the patchouli value chain actors in the marketing channel I, 
including average sales prices/ kg oil (P), total production/ marketing costs/ kg oil (TC), net profits (NP)/ kg 
oil, ROIs, existing patchouli oil share ratio between farmers and distillers, and average gross profits/ kg oil for 
both medium and large middlemen. Table 2 confirms that ROIs of the actors are inequal, where large 
middlemen have too high ROI, and distillers have too low ROI. The table also indicates that large middlemen 
have the highest ROI because they get too high gross profit margin (IDR 80,000 per kg), and distillers have 
the lowest ROI because they get too small oil share ratio (15%). 
 
Table 2. Pre-optimized financial data summary of the patchouli value chain actors in marketing channel I 
Actors Farmers 
Traditional 
distillers 
Medium 
middlemen 
Large 
middlemen 
Sales price per kg (IDR/kg) 556,079.67 576,079.67 576,079.67 656,079.67 
Total cost per kg oil produced (IDR/kg) 213,549.38 67,509.92 - - 
Total cost per kg oil owned/ purchased (IDR/kg) 251,234.57 450,066.14 15,170.71 15,716.07 
Net profit per kg (IDR/kg) 304,845.11 126,013.54 4,829.29 64,283.93 
ROI 121.3% 28.0% 31.8% 409.0% 
Oil share ratio (farmers: distillers = 85%: 15%) 5.67 1 - - 
Gross profit per kg (IDR/ kg) - - 20,000.00 80,000.00 
 
Optimization of Gayo Lues patchouli value chain 
Technology optimization 
The actors who play the most important role in improving the quality of post-harvest patchouli oil are the 
distillers. Thus, one of the simplest ways to improve the quality is to optimize the distillation unit technologically 
or modernize the distillation unit, so that the marketing channel will be as shown in Figure 2. The modernization 
is believed will significantly improve the patchouli oil quality because this type of distillation unit produces a 
higher PA level of light variant patchouli oil instead of a lower PA level of dark variant patchouli oil. Additionally, 
the physical optimization is likely to benefit the producers (farmers and distillers) because buyers (exporters/ 
suppliers) are willing to pay IDR 30,000 higher for the light variant patchouli oil than the dark one. 
Farmers (0,1)
Modern Distillers (2)
Medium Middlemen (3)Q0
P1; Q1
P2; Q2
P3; Q3
Big Middlemen (4) Exporter/ Supplier
P4; Q4
Q1
C2; Q1 + Q2
C3; Q3 C4; Q4
C1; Q1 + Q2
 
Note: P1 < P2 = P3 < P4; Q1 = Q3; Q2 + Q3 = Q4. 
Figure. 2. Marketing channel II, the marketing channel after technology optimization 
 
We noted some essential differences between traditional and modern distillation units, as presented in 
Table 3. The data were collected from the only current distillation unit operating in Rebebe Village, Gayo Lues, 
which was built by JIKA OISCA under the USAID IFACS project in 2013. The unit also introduced a 4: 1 oil 
share ratio between farmers and distillers instead of the 8.5: 1.5 ratio. Furthermore, some data calculated after 
the technology optimization compared to those presented in Tables 1 and 2 (pre-optimization) are as shown in 
Tables 4 and 5. The most important result of technology optimization is that all ROIs of the actors increase due 
to the changes in sales prices, costs, and net profits. 
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Table 3. The differences between traditional and modern distillation units 
Parameters Traditional distillation Modern distillation1) 
Operating capacities 35 kg dried leaves/ batch 200 kg dried leaves/ batch 
Total batches/ day 2 batches/ day 2 – 3 (2.5) batches/ day 
Regular working hours2) 4 – 6 hours/ batch 3 – 4 hours/ batch 
Biomass consumption per oil produced (IDR/ kg) 67,509.92 60,460.86 
% of patchouli oil yield 2% 2.2% 
PA level ±30 ±35 
Iron content Iron-contaminated Iron-free 
1)Even though this is a hydro-electric distillation unit, it also uses biomass as an alternative energy source, so we use biomass 
for a fair comparison. 
2)Optimal working hours are 8 - 12 hours/ batch for traditional distillation and 6-8 hours/ batch for modern distillation. 
 
Table 4. The production/ sales frequencies, business capacities, annual incomes, and investment costs of the 
patchouli value chain actors participating in the marketing channel post-technology optimization 
Actors Farmers Modern distillers Medium middlemen Large middlemen 
Productions/ sales 
frequencies 
semiannually, 2 
cropping seasons/ 
year 
daily, 2 batches/ day, 24 
working days/ month 
weekly, 52 transaction 
frequencies/ year 
monthly, 12 
transaction 
frequencies/ year 
Business capacities 0.7 ha/ farmer1), 
each farmer 
produces about 
178,2 kg oil/ ha/ 
year2) 
200 kg dried leaves/ batch, 
each distiller produces 
about 11.0 kg oil/ day = 
3168.0 kg oil/ year 
each middleman 
manages about 100 kg 
oil/ month = 1200 kg 
oil/ year 
each middleman 
manages about 578.75 
kg oil/ month = 
6,945.00 kg oil/ year 
Annual incomes 
(IDR) 
82,838,718 / ha 384,012,081/ distiller 30,000,000/ 
middleman 
694,500,000/ 
middleman 
Total annual costs 
(IDR) 
34,595,000/ ha 198,440,000/ distiller 18,762,547/ 
middleman 
110,884,361/ 
middleman 
Annual fixed costs 
(IDR) 
3,520,000/ ha 61,640,000/ distiller 1,340,000/ 
middleman 
16,590,000/ 
middleman 
Annual variable 
costs (IDR) 
31,075,000/ ha 136,800,000/ distiller 17,422,547/ 
middleman3) 
94,294,361/ 
middleman4) 
1) The average plantation area of patchouli per farmer in Gayo Lues is about 0.7 ha (Ernawati et al., 2018).  
2)farmers hold about 142.56 kg oil/ ha at existing “4: 1” of share ratio between farmers and distillers  
3)including IDR 1,340,953 total annual loan interest of the capital invested to purchase 100 kg oil/ month or 1,200 kg oil/ year 
( IDR 1,117/ kg) and IDR 11,621,593 total annual loan interest of the capital invested to deliver credit to the farmers ( IDR 
9,685/ kg) at 10% of discount factor  
4)including IDR 35,076,861 total annual loan interest of the capital invested to purchase 578.75 kg oil/ month or 6,945 kg oil/ 
year ( IDR 5,051/ kg) at 10% of discount factor  
 
Model optimization 
The model optimization was done using a nonlinear ROI equity model. This model aims to optimize the 
summary of financial data of the patchouli value chain actors, before (marketing channel I) and after the 
technology optimization (marketing channel II). The optimization will focus on how to make the ROIs are equal 
and maximum in a stable price system. The detail steps to develop the model are as follows: 
The decision variables 
The decision variables of the model are sales prices of farmers (P1); distillers (P2); and middlemen (P3, 4, …. 
m).  
The objective function 
It is assumed that each actor eagers to obtain an ideal (maximum) ROI, which is symbolized as M (Big 
M). Furthermore, the ∆ROI variable was set, which is the difference between the Big M and the ROI of each 
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actor. Thus, to obtain a maximum value of ROI for each actor, the objective function is to minimize the total 
value of ∆ROI: Min. ∑ ∆ROIj
m
j=1  = ∑ M − ROIj
m
j=1   ....................................... (1) 
Where M is ideal (maximum) ROI for each actor; ROIj is ROI of actor-j.  
 
Table 5. Financial data summary of the patchouli value chain actors in marketing channel II after the 
technology optimization 
Actors Farmers 
Modern 
distillers 
Medium 
middlemen 
Large 
middlemen 
Sales price per kg (IDR/kg) 581,079.67 606,079.67 606,079.67 706,079.67 
Total cost per kg oil produced (IDR/kg) 194,135.80 60,460.86 - - 
Total cost per kg oil owned/ purchased (IDR/kg) 242,669.75 302,304.29 15,635.46 15,966.07 
Net profit per kg (IDR/kg) 338,409.92 303,775.38 9,364.54 84,033.93 
ROI 139.5% 100.5% 59.9% 526.3% 
Oil share ratio (farmers: distillers = 80%: 20%) 4 1 - - 
Gross profit per kg (IDR/ kg) - - 25,000.00 100,000.00 
 
The constraints 
Various constraints of the model are as follows: 
1. Profitability constraint. For each actor of  the value chain, total revenue is larger than total cost:  TRj>TCj       
……...…………...………………...…...……………………….…………………….... (2) 
Where TRj is the total revenue of  actor-j; TCj is the total cost of  actor-j  
2. Price stability constraint. This constraint is vital because the tendency of  local patchouli oil prices set by 
large middlemen is usually very volatile (Directorate General of  National Export Development, 2015; 
Rahmayanti et al., 2019). The prices significantly affect patchouli oil supplies because the farmers’ production 
highly depends on last seen (monthly) local prices of  the patchouli oil. Thus, to maintain the stability of  the oil 
supply, the monthly sales price of  each actor (Pbm-1 = Pt) who sells the oil directly to large middlemen (Pbm) must 
be Pt lower stability < Pbm-1 < Pt upper stability... (3) 
Where Pt lower stability is the lowest constraint of  the sales price of  patchouli oil; Pbm-1 is the local sales price of  
oils sold to large middlemen (Pbm); Pt upper stability is the highest constraint of  the sales price of  patchouli oil.  
In this case, we first determined that the local price of  (dark) patchouli oil (Pbm-1) must be higher than the 
minimum price expected by the producers (Pt lower stability), which is IDR 500,000. This value was obtained through 
in-depth interviews with representatives of  farmers and distillers.  
Furthermore, the quantities supplied by many agricultural commodities, including patchouli oil, are mainly 
influenced by prices in previous periods (Dufresne and Vázquez-Abad, 2013). If  Pbm-1 is set to be higher than Pt 
lower stability, the quantity supplied may increase in the next period, which may trigger the decrease in the price. The 
decrease in the price may lead to the quantity supplied falls in the next period because the producers decrease 
their productions. The drop in quantity supplied will cause price rises, and so on. This cycle will repeat itself  
following the Cobweb Model Theorem proposed by Ezekiel (1938) that “the market must dynamically go 
towards the point each time quantity and price move away from the stable equilibrium point.”  Although high 
prices must technically be good news for the producers, high fluctuation of  the price is very risky, as the 
producers and middlemen can lose their investments if  price falls (Asibey et al., 2019; Huka et al., 2014). Thus, 
to control the quantity supplied fluctuation as well as to reduce the price fluctuation, the value of  P t upper stability 
should be precisely determined.  Because in one year, there is one planting period for two harvest periods, so to 
maintain actual quantity supplied/ demanded at the equilibrium point (market clearing), the monthly sales price 
of  patchouli oil in this year (Pbm-1 = Pt) must be the same as average monthly sales price of  patchouli oil in last 
year (Pt -1). However, it is well known that agricultural commodity prices are never constant for years because the 
productions are heavily affected by various uncontrollable factors, i.e., natural conditions (Boussard, 2005), and 
our target is to decrease the fluctuation instead.  Thus, to avoid bigger fluctuation, we set the average monthly 
local price of  patchouli oil this year to be lower than the average price of  patchouli oil last year, so that  
Pbm-1 = Pt < Pt-1 = Pt upper stability =  
∑ Pt−1 i.Qt−1i
n
i
Qt−1 i
 ..…………………….…………………….. (4) 
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Where Pt-1 i is last year’s monthly sales prices, Qt-1i is the previous year’s monthly quantity supplied. 
Table 6 shows the monthly local price and quantity supplied of  dark patchouli oil managed by three large 
middlemen using samples in the study area from January 2016 to December 2017, before the patchouli oil 
production fell drastically at the beginning of  2018. Based on the data, we analyze the main reason for the drop 
of  patchouli oil production is that despite the monthly prices in 2016 fluctuate and tend to decrease. However, 
they were still larger than IDR 500.000/kg, and the total amount of  local quantity supplied is about 20,835 kg, 
with the average monthly local price of  IDR 576,079.67. In 2017, the monthly prices were expected to increase 
(rebound). However, due to the increase of  quantity supplied of  the oil to a total amount of  22,545 kg, the 
monthly prices continued to fall, below IDR 500.000/kg, which made the drop of  the quantity supplied 
drastically in 2018. Therefore, we consider that the data of  the monthly sales prices of  patchouli oil used to 
calculate the Pt upper stability constraint is only the data in 2016 when the monthly prices set were still larger than 
IDR 500.000/kg. 
Table 6. Monthly local prices and quantities supplied of (dark) patchouli oil managed by three large 
middlemen (samples) 
2016  2017 
Month 
Quantity 
supplied (kg) 
Price 
(,000 IDR/kg) 
Month 
Quantity 
supplied (kg) 
Price 
(,000 IDR/kg) 
1 1,490 630 1 1,788 500 
2 1,611 630 2 1,796 500 
3 1,727 630 3 1,826 480 
4 1,890 580 4 1,889 450 
5 1,613 620 5 1,895 450 
6 1,727 580 6 1,913 400 
7 1,873 570 7 1,910 400 
8 1,823 570 8 1,906 400 
9 1,825 550 9 1,890 400 
10 1,811 550 10 1,971 380 
11 1,743 500 11 1,923 380 
12 1,702 520 12 1,838 400 
 
3. Quantity supplied constraint. Based on the marketing direction, if  there are some actors selling patchouli oil 
to actor n, the restriction can be formulated as: ∑ Qj
𝑛−1
j=1  = Qn …............................... (5) 
Where Qj is the quantity of  oil supplied by actor/s j; Qn is the quantity of  oil purchased by actor n. 
4. Equivalent ROI constraint. The equality among patchouli value chain actors can be formulated as follows: 
ROI1 = ROI2 =……. = ROIi …………….………………………………...….……... (6) 
Based on the market direction in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, the equations of  ROIs for all actors can be described 
as follows: 
a. Farmers.  
Total revenue (TR) of  farmers from the sales of  Q1 oil is TR1 = P1. Q1 ……………….… (7) 
The total cost (TC) of  farmers to produce Q1 + Q2 oil is TC1 = C1. (Q1 + Q2) ….. ….…... (8) 
Thus, the ROI of  farmers is ROI1 = 
P1 .Q1−C1 .(Q1+Q2)
C1 .(Q1+Q2)
 = 
P1 .Q1 
C1 .(Q1+Q2)
 – 1 ……….…..…….. (9) 
b. Distillers 
TR of  distillers from the sales of  Q2 oil is TR2 = P2.Q2 ….......................................................... (10) 
TC of  distillers to produce Q1 + Q2 oil is TC2 = C2. (Q1 + Q2) ………….……….……… (11) 
Thus, the ROI of  distillers is ROI2 = 
P2 .Q2−C2 .(Q1+Q2)
C2 .(Q1+Q2)
 = 
P2 .Q2
C2 .(Q1+Q2)
–1 .……….……….….... (12) 
c. Medium middlemen 
TR of the middlemen from the sales of Q3 = Q1 oil is TR3 = P3.Q3-P1.Q1 = (P3-P1).Q3 …. (13) 
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TC of the middlemen to purchase Q1 = Q3 oil is TC3 = C3.Q3 = (C3a + C3b + C3c).Q3 = 
C3a.Q3+P1.Q1.
i3
n3
+C31L.Q1.
i3
n31L
 = (C3a + P1.
i3
n3
+ C31L.
i3
n31L
).Q3 ………....……………….….. (14) 
Where C3a is marketing cost/ kg without loan interest cost of the capital invested in purchasing oil from 
farmers and in delivering loans to farmers; C3b = P1.
i3
n3
 Is loan interest cost of the capital invested in 
purchasing per kg oil from farmers in n3 frequencies of transactions/ year; C3c = C31L.
i3
n31L
 Is loan interest 
cost of the capital invested in delivering loans to farmers producing a kg oil/ year. Amount of the loan 
given (C31L) is assumed about 1/3 sales price/ kg oil of farmers (P1); thus the value will change 
dynamically following the equation C31L = 
i3
3
.P1; i3 is a discount factor, and n31L is the number of total 
frequencies of loans delivered annually, which is based on whole numbers of planting period/ year. It 
is important to note that in this study, the interest costs of the invested money are considered as parts 
of investment costs, but not the amount of the invested capital. 
Thus, the ROI of medium middlemen is ROI3 = 
(P3 −P1).Q3 –(C3a+ P1.
i3
n3
+ C31L .
i3
n31L
).Q3
(C3a+ P1.
i3
n3
+ C31L .
i3
n31L
).Q3
 = 
P3 −P1
C3a+ P1.
i3
n3
+ 
P1
3
 .
i3
n31L
 – 1 ….......………………...………...………...………..........………....... (15) 
d. Large Middlemen  
TR of  the middlemen from the sale of  Q4 = Q2+Q3 oil is TR4 = P4.Q4 - P2.Q2 - P3.Q3. Since P2 = P3, 
then TR4 = (P4-P3). Q4 ........................................................................................................... (16) 
TC of  the middlemen to purchase Q2+Q3 = Q4 oil is TC4 = C4.Q4 = C4a.Q4a + (P2.Q2 + P3.Q3).
i4
n4
 = 
(C4a + P2. 
i4
n4
). Q4 …....................................................................................................................... (17) 
Where C4a is marketing cost/ kg without loan interest cost of  the capital invested in purchasing the oil; 
and P2.
i4
n4
 Is annual loan interest cost of  capital invested in purchasing a kg of  oil from distillers and 
medium middlemen in n4 transaction frequencies/ year; i4 is a discount factor. 
Thus, the ROI of  large middlemen is ROI4 =  
(P4−P3).  Q4−(C4a+P2.i 4
n4
).Q4
(C4a+P2 .i 4
n4
) .Q4
 = 
P4−P3
C4a+P2 .i 4
n4
 – 1 …… (18) 
ROIs of farmers and distillers, as shown in equations 9 and 12, depending on the oil share ratio between 
them. The ideal patchouli oil share ratio (η) can be obtained from an optimum state, when ROI1 = ROI2  
P1 .Q1 
C1 .(Q1+Q2)
 – 1 = 
P2 .Q2
C2 .(Q1+Q2)
 – 1   
P1 .Q1 
C1 
=  
 P2 .Q2
C2 
  η= 
 Q1 
Q2 
=  
C1.P2  
C2.P1 
 ............... (19) 
From equation 22, the oil share for farmers can also be written as 
 Q1 
Q1+Q2
=  
C1.P2 
C1.P2+C2.P1
.. …(20) 
And the oil share for distillers is 
 Q2 
Q1+Q2
=  
C2.P1 
C1.P2+C2.P1
 …………………………………...… (21) 
At an optimum state (ROI1 = ROI2), by substituting equations 20 and 21 into equations 9 and 12, then 
the equations 9 and 12 can also be written as ROI1 = ROI2  
2.P1 .P2 
C1.P2+ C2.P1
 – 1 …………….(22) 
e. General price constraints.  
- P1 < P2 = P3 < P4 …...……………………………….…………………………… (23) 
- P1, P2, P3, P4 > 0 ...…………………………………….…………………………. (24) 
The model for each marketing channel requires the following input data: C1, C2, C3a, n3, n31L, C4a, i3, i4, n4, 
Pt lower stability, and Pt upper stability. Where C1 is production cost/ kg oil of farmers; C2 is production cost/ kg oil of 
distillers; C3a is marketing cost/ kg oil of medium middlemen without loan interest costs of invested capital to 
purchase oil and to deliver loans to farmers: i3 is a discount factor of medium middlemen; n3 is total frequencies 
of transactions between medium middlemen and large middlemen per year; n31L is total frequencies of loan 
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delivered by medium middlemen to farmers annually, based on numbers of planting periods/ year; C4a  is 
marketing cost/ kg oil of large middlemen without loan interest cost of invested capital to purchase the oil; i4 is 
a discount factor of large middlemen; n4 is total frequencies of transactions between large middlemen and buyers 
per year; Pt lower stability is lower price stability constraint, and Pt upper stability is upper price stability constraint. The 
executed model will produce optimum values of Z and sales prices of farmers (P1), distillers (P2), medium 
middlemen (P3), and large middlemen (P4). Then, the ideal oil share ratio between farmers and distillers can be 
calculated using equations 19, 20, and 21. 
 
Model execution and validation 
Based on the data presented in Tables 1, 2, 4, and 5, we secured input data of the model to optimize the 
marketing channel I and II, as shown in Table 7.  It is important to note that for marketing channel I, the Pt lower 
stability (IDR 500,000.00) was based on the minimum price of dark variant patchouli oil expected by the producers. 
In contrast, the Pt upper stability was based on the average monthly local price of dark variant patchouli oil in 2016 
(IDR 576,079.67). Since the sales price of light variant oil is about IDR 30,000/ kg more expensive than the sales 
price of dark variant oil, then for marketing channel II, the Pt lower stability must be about IDR 530,000.00, and the 
Pt upper stability must be about IDR 606,079.67. 
Table 7. Input data of the model 
Parameters Marketing Channel I Marketing Channel II 
C1 IDR 213.549,38/ kg IDR 194,135.80/ kg 
C2 IDR 67.509,92/ kg IDR 60,460.86/ kg 
C3a IDR 4.833,33/ kg IDR 4.833,33/ kg 
i3 10% 10% 
n3 52 (weekly transactions of  sales) 52 (weekly transactions of  sales) 
n31L n31L = 2 (planting periods/ year) n31L = 2 (planting periods/ year) 
C4a IDR 10.915,41/ kg IDR 10.915,41/ kg 
i4 10% 10% 
n4 12 (monthly transactions of  sales) 12 (monthly transactions of  sales) 
Pt lower stability IDR 500,000.00 IDR 530,000.00 
Pt upper stability IDR 576,079.67 IDR 606,079.67 
 
Thus, the final models for both marketing channels as follows:  
1. Marketing channel I: objective function, Min Z = f(P) = M + 4 – (
2.P1 .P2 
213549.38.P2+67509.92.P1
 + 
P3 − P1
4333.33 +0.0186.P1
 + 
P4 − P3
10915.41 +0.00833.P2 
); subject to: (1) linear inequalities: 1.0186.P1 – P3 ≤ -4833.34 and 
1.00833.P3 – P4 ≤ -10915.42; (2) linear equalities: P2 – P3 = 0; (3) lower bounds: P1 = 246883.56, P2 = 500,000.00, 
P3 = 500,000.00, and P4 = 515082.07; and upper bounds: P1 = 560820.83, P2 = 576,079.674,  P3 = 576,079.674, 
and P4 = Inf; (4) nonlinear constraints: -P1. P2 + 67509.92.P1 + 213549.38.P2 + 0.01 ≤ 0; 0.0186.P12.P2 + 
67509.92.P12 + 218382.72.P1.P2 – 67509.92.P1.P3 – 213549.38.P2.P3 = 0; and 0.00833.P1.P22 + 10915.41.P1.P2 
+ 67509.92.P1.P3 – 67509.92.P1.P4 + 213549.38. P2.P3 – 213549.38.P2.P4 = 0; (5) start point: [246883.57; 
500000.01; 500000.01; 515082.08].  
2. Marketing channel II: objective function, Min Z = f(P) = M + 4 – (
2.P1 .P2 
194135.80.P2+60460.86.P1
 + 
P3 − P1
4333.33 +0.0186.P1
 + 
P4 − P3
10915.41 +0.00833.P2 
); subject to: (1) linear inequalities: 1.0186.P1 – P3 ≤ -4833.34 and 
1.00833.P3 – P4 ≤ -10915.42; (2) linear equalities: P2 – P3 = 0; (3) lower bounds: P1 = 219133.96, P2 = 530,000.00, 
P3 = 530,000.00, and P4 = 545332.07; and upper bounds: P1 = 590273.31, P2 = 606079.67,  P3 = 606079.67, 
and P4 = Inf; (4) nonlinear constraints: -P1. P2 + 60460.86.P1 + 194135.80.P2 + 0.01 ≤ 0; 0.0186.P12.P2 + 
60460.86.P12 + 198969.14.P1.P2 – 60460.86.P1.P3 – 194135.80.P2.P3 = 0; and 0.00833.P1.P22 + 10915.41.P1.P2 
+ 60460.86.P1.P3 – 60460.86.P1.P4 + 194135.80. P2.P3 – 194135.80.P2.P4 = 0; (5) start point: [219133.98; 
530000.01; 530000.01; 545332.08]. 
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The models were solved by using the FMINCON function in MATLAB software package together with 
the Microsoft Excel software package.  Outputs of the models are as shown in Tables 8 and 9. Furthermore, to 
validate the models, the essential thing to observe is that the ROIs of the optimized model must be the same, as 
shown in Tables 8 and 9.  Moreover, the (local) sales prices of both distillers and medium middlemen should be 
as close as possible to the value of Pt upper stability to maximize the (equal) ROIs.  
Table 8. Financial data summary of the value chain actors in marketing channel I after the model optimization 
Actors Farmers 
Traditional 
Distillers 
Medium 
middlemen 
Large 
middlemen 
Sales price per kg (IDR/kg) 546,548.67 576,079.66 576,079.66 607,018.40 
Total cost per kg oil produced (IDR/kg) 213,549.38 67,509.92 - - 
Total cost per kg oil owned/ purchased 
(IDR/kg) 
277,598.61 292,597.76 14,993.53 15,716.07 
Net profit per kg (IDR/kg) 268,950.06 283,481.91 14,537.46 15,222.66 
ROI 96.9% 96.9% 96.9% 96.9% 
Oil share ratio (farmers: distillers) 3.334 1 - - 
Gross profit per kg (IDR/ kg) - - 29,530.99 30,938.73 
 
The data in Table 8, compared to those in Table 2, indicate that after the model optimization of marketing 
channel I, ROIs of the actors have been the same. ROI of the distillers is increased due to the increase in their 
oil share ratio to the farmers. ROI of the medium middlemen is also increased due to the rise in both net and 
gross profits per kg oil. Furthermore, if we compare the data presented in Table 9 to those in Table 5, the outputs 
of the model recommend that to make the ROIs are equal, oil share ratio for distillers should be increased. In 
contrast, the oil share ratio for farmers should be decreased. Additionally, the outputs also recommend that both 
net gross and profits per kg of medium middlemen should be increased, while both net and gross profits per kg 
of large middlemen should be decreased. 
Table 9. Financial data summary of the value chain actors in marketing channel II after the model optimization 
Actors Farmers 
Modern 
Distillers 
Medium 
middlemen 
Large 
middlemen 
Sales price per kg (IDR/kg) 570,942.28 606,079.65 606,079.65 642,379.39 
Total cost per kg oil produced (IDR/kg) 194,135.80 60,460.86 - - 
Total cost per kg oil owned/ purchased 
(IDR/kg) 
251,091.45 266,544.32 15,447.00 15,966.07 
Net profit per kg (IDR/kg) 319,850.83 339,535.34 19,690.37 20,333.66 
ROI 127.4% 127.4% 127.4% 127.4% 
Oil share ratio (farmers: distillers) 3.409 1 - - 
Gross profit per kg (IDR/ kg) - - 35,137.38 36,299.73 
 
Discussion 
Modernization of distillation units in Gayo Lues 
Quality of the Gayo Lues patchouli oil has not been improved so much compared to what we observed 
in 2010 – 2012, before first modern distillation units funded by Aceh Economic Development Financing Facility 
(Aceh – EDFF) project started operating in 2012 (World Bank, 2012). The operations of the modern distillation 
units temporarily improved the quality of Gayo Lues patchouli oil, producing iron-free oil (light variant oil), one 
of the vital quality indicators. However, all the distillation units with capacities of 100 – 300 kg dried leaves have 
stopped operating now. We assume that the lowest ROI and small patchouli oil share ratio earned by distillers 
(farmers: distillers = 85%: 15%), have contributed to the situation. Most distillers are now re-operating small 
traditional distillation units with capacities of 35 kg, which are much cheaper, and modernization is not always 
Aceh Int. J. Sci. Technol., 8(3)): 114-126 
December, 2019 
 doi: 10.13170/aijst.8.3.15108 
 124 
more reasonable in the situation (Hogervorst & Kerver, 2019). In fact, many distillers are also farmers, since 
only being a distiller is the most unfavorable role in the value chain.   
The modern distillation unit with a 200 kg dried leaves/ batch operating capacity located in Rebebe Village 
- Gayo Lues is the only current unit that has been serving since 2013. However, its capacity is too small compared 
to the total capacity of traditional distillation units in Gayo Lues. The findings of the study are the modernization 
of the distillation unit and the application of “farmers: distillers = 80%: 20%” oil share ratio have made the 
distillers receive a better ROI in the value chains. However, at these stages, the equity among the actors is not 
yet fully guaranteed. 
 
Equity in Gayo Lues value chain 
As aforementioned, modernization of the distillation unit can increase the ROI of the actors in the 
patchouli value chain, but it does not guarantee equity among the actors. Therefore, this study also developed a 
nonlinear ROI equity model to ensure that the distillers, as well as the other actors, receive an equity, including 
fair sales prices of patchouli oil, reasonable (net/ gross) profit margins, and ideal oil share ratio between the 
producers (farmers and distillers), and the most important thing is equal and ideal ROIs. 
Margin and profit margin are the popular financial indicators usually used to measure equity among actors 
in value chains (Muchfirodin et al., 2015; Odongo & Etany, 2018). Nevertheless, these indicators are arguably 
more applicable to similar business models. In fact, the actors in the patchouli value chain have different business 
models, where farmers and distillers are more as producers, and middlemen are more like distributors. Therefore, 
an alternative indicator to measure equity in the patchouli value chain is preferable, which can guarantee that the 
result is fair and impartial, to reflect better attraction of each business. We chose ROI or net-profit-to-cost ratio, 
which is one of the financial indicators widely used as a quantitative decision support tool (Zamfir et al., 2016; 
Matthews, 2011). The main advantage of ROI, besides its simplicity and versatility, is that the ROI can compare 
businesses with different business models. There is also a limitation of the ROI, especially when we compare 
businesses/ projects with different time frames. However, we could eliminate the weakness in the model by 
comparing the businesses with the same (adjusted) time frame of ROI.  
The transformations of equity of ROI values in the Gayo Lues value chain, before and post-
modernization, and after the model optimizations are as shown in Table 10. Distillers and medium middlemen 
gain the most advantages from the complete transformations. However, since there is no added-value activity 
carried out by both middlemen, the most important findings that may significantly affect the improvement of 
Gayo Lues patchouli oil quality from outputs of the model are the modernization of the distillation units and 
application of ideal patchouli oil share ratio between farmers and distillers to be around 3.3 – 3.4: 1. 
Mathematically, the considerably better oil share ratio can help the distillers increasing their ROI value, as shown 
by the outputs of the model, as presented in Table 10, as well as help them enhancing the oil quality.  
Table 10. Transformations of the equity of ROIs in the Gayo Lues value chain 
Actors 
Initial 
ROI 
Post-modernization 
ROI 
Initial ROI + 
Equity Model 
Post-modernization+ 
Equity Model ROI 
Farmers 121.3% 139.5% 96.9% 127.4% 
Distillers 28.0% 100.5% 96.9% 127.4% 
Medium middlemen 31.8% 59.9% 96.9% 127.4% 
Large middlemen 409.0% 526.3% 96.9% 127.4% 
 
Conclusion 
Modernization of the distillation unit in Gayo Lues has positive effects on financial performance 
indicators of all actors in the Gayo Lues value chain. However, equity among actors is not established. The 
application of “farmers: distillers = 80%: 20%” oil share ratio has further contributions to the distillers to receive 
a better ROI in the value chains. 
The applications of an ROI equity model can guarantee ROIs all of the actors are equal and maximal in a 
stable price system. Distillers and medium middlemen gain the most advantages from the complete 
transformations, which are much higher ROIs than those in pre-optimized conditions.  The research finding 
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suggests that the ideal patchouli oil share ratio between farmers and distillers is around 3.3 – 3.4: 1. Additionally, 
the outputs of the ROI equity model also recommend that both net gross and profits per kg of medium 
middlemen should be increased. In contrast, both net and gross profits per kg of large middlemen should be 
decreased. 
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